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1
 This research was primarily led and conducted by CRGI researchers Britta Beckstead and Cory Hoerner in 
collaboration with the full CRGI research team.  It is a “working document,” subject to revision, and is not offered 





In 1927 Arizona Governor George Hunt, one of the most vigorous opponents of the 
Colorado River Compact, opined: “Water is the life blood of the western states, and without it, 
they die . . . even human life itself is no more jealously guarded by our laws in the semi-arid 
states of the west than is the use of water.”
2
  Nearly a century later, this statement is as true as 
ever, in large part because the Colorado River is overallocated and its flow is declining, thereby 
ensuring that some users will not receive waters promised to them in the basinwide water 
apportionment scheme.
3
  Determining which states will be shorted (and by how much) is a 
highly contentious legal, political, and scientific issue.   
At the heart of the legal issue are those rules describing how water is to be shared 
between the states of the Upper Basin (Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) and Lower 
Basin (Arizona, California and Nevada), the primary focus of the seminal 1922 Colorado River 
Compact. The language of the Compact (specifically Article III(a) and (d)) supports different 
interpretations as to the priority of water rights between the Upper and Lower Basins.  
Traditionally, the prevailing interpretation has been that the Upper Basin has the obligation to 
deliver 75 million-acre feet every ten years (an average of 7.5 million acre-feet/year) 
downstream to the Lower Basin, and if this leaves insufficient water for the Upper Basin to 
consume the 7.5 million acre-feet promised in Article III(a), then the Upper Basin must bear that 
shortage in its entirety.  However, a counter interpretation more favorable to the Upper Basin is 
that they do not have a delivery obligation, but rather an “obligation not to deplete” the flow of 
the river below an average of 7.5 million acre-feet/year based on the language used in Article 
III(d) of the Compact.  The basis for this interpretation comes from the actual use of the word 
“depletion” in the Compact, defined in one Bureau report as “the reductions in virgin stream 
flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry and at the international boundary resulting from man-
made improvements” (emphasis added).
4
  Therefore, to the extent that climate change and 
variability (whether anthropogenic or not) are responsible for flows insufficient to fulfill all 
                                                 
2
 George Hunt, Governor of Arizona, Speech at the Conference of Governors Commissioners and Advisors of the 
States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming on the Colorado River (Aug. 
22 1927) (transcript published by the Arizona Commission on the Colorado River on Sept. 24, 1927). 
3
 For a summary of this issue, see the CRGI report:  Rethinking the Future of the Colorado River (December, 2010). 
4




promised allocations, this is a problem that cannot be attributed to the actions of Upper Basin 
water users, and Upper Basin water users thus cannot be expected to bear the full burden of any 
such flow deficiencies. 
There are two important aspects to determining the correct interpretation of the Colorado 
River Compact on this matter: (1) the text of the document itself and subsequent legislation built 
upon it (the so-called “Law of the River”); and (2) the intent of the Compact’s negotiators and 
later legislators involved in crafting the Law of the River.
5
  This material is reviewed in the 
following pages, focusing on the following documents: the Colorado River Compact (1922), the 
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (1948), the Colorado River Storage Act (1956), Arizona v. 
California (1963), the Colorado River Basin Project Act (1968), and the Colorado River Basin 
Salinity Control Act (1974).  This examination of the text of key Law of the River elements and 
their legislative history reveals statements supportive of both interpretations, thereby putting a 
premium on the issue of legislative intent.  However, determining the intent of the parties is 
complicated by the fact that those involved often used the terms “delivery” and “deplete” in 
relation to Article III(d) interchangeably, sometimes even adjusting the wording based on 
whichever side needed more convincing to accept the proposal at issue.  Given these 
complications, this paper does not pretend to offer a definitive answer to this seminal “delivery-
or-deplete” question, but rather serves to highlight key issues, data, and arguments associated 
with this controversy.  
 
The Colorado River Compact (1922) 
The Compact provides two interwoven threads contributing to the “delivery-or-deplete” 
question, namely: the practical meaning of the language in Article III(d); and the role of equity 
and equitable apportionment in the allocation of risk among the basins.  
 
                                                 
5
 Hearings on S. 75 and S.J. Res. 4 Before the Comm. On Interior and Insular Affairs, 81
st
 Cong. 1 (1949) 
(statement of James H. Howard, General Counsel for Metropolitan Water District of Southern California: “The 
primary rule of compact interpretation – and a compact is a contract – is to ascertain the intent of the parties at 
the time they made the deal...of course, the words they use are the primary indication of their intent”).  
 
4 
The Meaning of Article III(d) 
The strongest argument for interpreting the Upper Basin’s responsibility as an obligation not to 
deplete (rather than a delivery obligation) is in the language of the Colorado River Compact’s 
Article III(d): “the states of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry 
to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive 
years.”
6
  This Article explicitly uses the term deplete rather than deliver—in contrast to Article 
III(c), which uses “deliver” when describing the Upper Basin’s obligation to fulfill its share of 
the Mexican Treaty obligation.
7
  In fact, regarding Article III(d), the merits of the term 
“delivery” were discussed, with a majority of the commissioners
8
 concluding the word should 
not be used in the Article:  
Judge Clifford Sloan: I think the word “delivery” ought to be eliminated. 
Herbert Hoover: This refers to 75,000,000 feet.  It is in the sense of a delivery. 
New Mexico Commissioner, Stephen Davis, Jr.: I don’t like the word delivery 
very much. 
Herbert Hoover: You could change it to flow. 
Colorado Commissioner, Delph Carpenter: I don’t know how the upper states 
could withhold the use of water on its way.  
Stephen Davis, Jr.: I think ‘flow’ is better than ‘delivery.’  
Judge Clifford Sloan: That changes the whole meaning.  
Stephen Davis, Jr.: The word ‘delivery’ is not the right word.  I think either one of 
two things: either strike out those words or put in “a flow of water.”  I think it is 
better to strike out the words.
9
  
The plain meaning of the language of Article III(d) is crucial to its interpretation, because 
each word was presumably chosen by the Commission for a reason and to avoid 
                                                 
6
 Colorado River Compact, art. III(d), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324-25 (1928). 
7
 Colorado River Compact, art. III(c), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324-25 (1928). 
8
 Five Commissioners, Frank Emerson (WY), R.E. Caldwell (UT), W.F. McClure (CA), Stephen Davis, Jr. (NM), 
and J.G. Scrugham (NV) voted to strike the term. Interestingly, much of the opposition to taking out the word 
“delivery” came from Delph Carpenter (CO), an Upper Basin representative Colorado River Compact 
negotiations, Session 25 in Sante Fe, 245, 256 (Nov. 23, 1922). W.S. Norviel of Arizona also supported this 
opinion. 
9





  While the language selected did not include the phrase “delivery 
obligation,” the question remains whether a de facto delivery obligation exists?  As noted earlier 
and discussed in subsequent sections, several commentators at the time, and many more since, 
interpret III(d) as a delivery obligation.  Perhaps most influential at the time was the 
interpretation offered by Herbert Hoover, the federal commissioner in the Compact negotiations.  
Responding to a question in 1923 from Arizona Congressman Carl Hayden regarding the 
practical meaning of Article III(d), Hoover remarked:  “[I]n the improbable event of a 
deficiency, the Lower Basin has the first call on the water up to a total of 75,000,000 acre-feet 
each 10 years.”
11
  But even this seemingly definitive statement comes with a caveat, as the 
statement may have been shaped by Hoover’s efforts to convince a skeptical Arizona to ratify the 
Compact.   
 
Equity and Equitable Apportionment 
A second (and related) argument in favor of the “not deplete” interpretation is that the 
purpose of the Colorado River Compact was to divide the waters equitably between the two 
basins.
12
  The purposes of the Compact set forth in Article I include “the equitable division and 
apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System.”
 13
  This provision, as well 
as the Compact itself, was made in response to the holding of Kansas v. Colorado in which the 
court rejected both the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines in favor of equitable 
                                                 
10
 FRANK C. EMERSON, IN RE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT 13 (1923), available at 
http://digitool.library.colostate.edu/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=63647 (accessed July 11, 2011).  Note that 
according to Webster’s 1913 Revised Unabridged Dictionary, the definition of deplete is “to empty or unload,” 
while deliver means “to give, or transfer; to put into another's hand or power; to commit; to pass from one to 
another.” To not empty is a very different obligation than to transfer, but the other definition of deplete, 
“unload,” is much more similar to the definition of deliver. This similarity between the two definitions at the 
time the compact was written could have led to some of the confusion faced today.  Webster’s Revised 
Unabridged Dictionary, 1913 ed., THE ARTFL PROJECT, http://machaut.uchicago.edu/websters (accessed July 
14, 2011). 
11
 John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of 
Rivalries between the Upper and Lower Basins. 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L Inst. §21.02(1) (1986). 
12
 John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary View of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of 
Rivalries between the Upper and Lower Basins. 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L Inst. §21.03(2) (1986). “The current 
presupposition that the Upper Basin should be subordinated to the needs of the Lower violates the principles 
upon which the law of the River was founded.”  
13
 Colorado River Compact, art. I, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324-25 (1928). 
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apportionment of waters between states.
14
  Thus, the members of the Commission used Article 
III(a) to divide the water believed to flow through the Colorado River equally between the two 
basins.
15
  The “not deplete” interpretation views Article III(a) as overriding all the provisions 
that follow it because it allocates 7.5 million acre-feet equally to each basin and is stated “so 
prominently and emphatically.”
16
  Carpenter himself viewed Article III(a) as being the clearly 
superior provision and thought of the Compact’s distribution of the water supply definitively as: 
1) 7,500,000 acre feet beneficial consumptive use each year is permanently allocated to 
the Upper Basin; 2) 7,500,000 acre feet plus 1,000,000 acre feet beneficial consumptive 
use each year is allocated to the Lower Basin, irrespective of where used or whether 
diverted from the Gila and other tributaries or from the main stream;  3) Mexico is to 
receive whatever amount shall be fixed by treaty;  4) any residue remaining at the end of 
forty years shall be equitably apportioned among the seven states.
17
   
Furthermore, the similarity between the numbers described in Article III(a) and Article 
III(d) could have been merely a coincidence.  According to a letter by Delph Carpenter to 
Northcutt Ely, the Secretary of the Interior in 1950, the delivery of 75,000,000 acre feet of water 
every ten years “bears no direct relation” to the 7.5 million acre-feet allocated to the Lower 
Basin by Article III(a).
18
  There is a good chance that time has blurred the distinction between 
these two Articles – as one academic quipped “the commissioners understood the difference 
between III(a) and III(d), but some of their successors in public office did not.”
19
  
The argument in favor of equity as a controlling premise of the allocation further rests on 
the idea that the Upper Basin would never had agreed to a “delivery obligation” framework that 
required it to completely shoulder the burden of any persistent drought or permanent change in 
the flow regime.
20
    In fact, during the negotiations Delph Carpenter stated just that:  
                                                 
14
 Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado River Compact Entitlements Clearing Up Misconceptions, 28 J. Land Resources 
& Envtl. L. 83, 84 (2008). 
15
 Colorado River Compact, art. III(a), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324-25 (1928). 
16
 John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of 
Rivalries between the Upper and Lower Basins. 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L Inst. §21.05ii(a)(1986). 
17
 Papers of Delph E. Carpenter and Family, December 4, 1950 Letter to Northcutt Ely ¶4, available at 
http://lib.colostate.edu/archives/findingaids/water/wdec.html (accessed July 8, 2011). 
18
 Papers of Delph E. Carpenter and Family, December 4, 1950 Letter to Northcutt Ely ¶1, available at 
http://lib.colostate.edu/archives/findingaids/water/wdec.html (accessed July 8, 2011). 
19
 Daniel Tyler, Delphus Emory Carpenter and the Colorado River Compact of 1922, U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 251, 
267 (1997). 
20
 John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of 
Rivalries between the Upper and Lower Basins. 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L Inst. §21.05(1)(b)(i) (1986). “The 
question remains, though, whether the parties believed that the Upper Basin had been allocated the risk of 
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[I]t seems to me incumbent upon the lower states to be reasonable in the demand 
of guarantee. . . an absolutely preferred delivery should not run wholly to the 
lower states. . . in making a division of the water it should rather be the 
disposition to lay the burden of water shortage, a drouth, upon the whole 
territory.
21
   
In a later session, Carpenter again stressed the inequity of requiring a delivery obligation:  
[The Lower Basin is] unfettered in the entire absorption of the lower streams, to 
the extent of absolute dominion thereof, while there is imposed upon [the Upper 
Basin] the burden, whether an abundance of water is supplied by Nature or not, of 
meeting this guaranty. . . the burden of saying that we will do such a thing, and if 
we fail, then we violate the compact, leaves upon us the burden of opening our 
structures, and perhaps utterly depriving ourselves of water, to comply with the 
contract.”
22
   
Also, the commissioners may have wanted the quantity in Article III(d) to be adjustable if 
the amount proved too much.
23
 Above all, one of the main reasons for the Upper Basin even 
entering into the Compact was their fear that the Lower Basin would gain a legal right to more 
water through faster development under the doctrine of prior appropriation.   
 
The argument against this line of reasoning is that the delivery obligation was part of the 
agreement between the Basins and was designed to allay each of their respective fears.  The 
Upper Basin was afraid that under prior appropriation the Lower Basin would seize all of the 
water
24
, a concern exacerbated by the decision in Wyoming v. Colorado where the Court upheld 
the use of the prior appropriation doctrine in controversies over interstate waters.
25
  The Lower 
Basin, on the other hand, wanted to be guaranteed water in a drought
26
 and have the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                             
shortages of water by committing to Article III(d) not to deplete the flow of the River below 75 m.a.f. Probably 
not. It is significant that after November 15 the word ‘guaranty’ effectively disappeared from the Record of 
negotiations.”  
21
 Colorado River Compact negotiations, Session 13 in Santa Fe, 95, 117 (Nov. 13, 1922). 
22
 Colorado River Compact negotiations, Session 17 in Santa Fe, 89, 97 (Nov. 15, 1922). 
23
 Colorado River Compact negotiations, Session 22 in Sante Fe, 136, 143 (Nov. 22, 1922) (statement of Frank 
Emerson, “...if it were found 75,000,000 were in excess of the amount needed there would want to be a 
reconsideration of that, surely”). 
24
 Eric Kuhn, The Colorado River: The Story of a Quest for Certainty on a Diminishing River (Roundtable Edition), 
Colorado River Water Conservation Board 23 (May 8, 2007).  
25
 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
26
 Papers of Delph Carpenter and Family, December 5, 1935 Letter to Northcutt Ely ¶1, 
http://lib.colostate.edu/archives/findingaids/water/wdec.html (accessed July 8, 2011). “The paragraph [Article 
III(d)] originated solely out of a fear entertained by Commissioners for California and Arizona, that the Upper 
States would exceed their allocation and would unduly deplete the supply to the Lower Basin in a period of 
extreme drought.”  
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develop it without Upper Basin opposition.
27
  As a compromise, the Upper Basin agreed to 
ensure an average annual delivery at Lee Ferry of 7.5 million acre-feet and a cap was put on the 
amount of water available to the Lower Basin (7.5 million acre-feet plus an additional 1.0 
million acre-feet per year).
28
  By their very nature, compacts require compromise and instances 
of give and take.
29
  The Colorado River Compact commissioners may have viewed this 
agreement as equitable apportionment in a more figurative sense:  
This is a guaranty on the part of the upper states to deliver to the lower states. . . 
this figure is an expression of an equitable apportionment under the circumstances 
that now exist and will exist on the river, as a whole, so you have got those two 
things - equitable apportionment and a guaranty of filling the lower states’ 
requirements.
30
   
The text of Article III(b)—awarding an additional 1 million acre-feet to the Lower 
Basin—also supports the idea that an “equitable” division of water does not necessarily mean an 
“equal” division in volume or, presumably, risk of curtailment.
31
  Similarly, Article III(e) 
specifies that the Upper Basin cannot “withhold water. . . which cannot reasonably be applied to 
domestic and agricultural uses.”
32
   
  
                                                 
27
 James S. Lochhead, Colorado Commissioner to the Upper Colorado River Compact Commission, Statement 
before the House of Representatives Resource Committee Concerning the Proposal to Drain Lake Powell, 
(September 23, 1997), available at http://www.lakepowell.org/testimony/lochhead.htm (accessed on July 7, 
2011) 
28
 Colorado River Compact, art. III(d) and (b), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324-25 (1928). 
29
 Hearings on S. 728 and S. 1274 before the Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 70
th
 Cong. 280 (1
st
 Session 
1927) (statement of Mulford Winsor, Secretary of the Arizona Colorado River Commission, “in the very nature 
of cases calling for treaties there must be compromises: there must be a yielding here and there”). 
30
 Colorado River Compact Negotiations, Session 17 in Santa Fe, 89, 90-4 (Nov. 15, 1922); see generally Charles J. 
Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 Stanford Law Review 1, 11-12 (1966) (describing of the motivations behind 
the two Basins agreeing to the Compact). 
31
 John U. Carlson & Alan E. Boles, Jr., Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado River: An Examination of 
Rivalries between the Upper and Lower Basins. 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L Inst. §21.05(1)(b)(i) (1986). “There is a 
general misconception that the intent of the compact was to split the use of the water 50/50. As you can see with 
Article III(b), that is not the case.”  
32
 Colorado River Compact, art. III(e), 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324-25 (1928); argued by Lawrence J. MacDonnell, 
David H. Getches, & William H. Hugenberg, Jr. The Law of the Colorado River: Coping with Severe Sustained 
Drought. 31 Water Res. Bulletin 825, 829 (1995). 
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The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (1948) 
By the 1940s, the commissioners negotiating the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact 
were well aware of the fact that there was far less than 17.5 million acre-feet of water in the river 
(the total amount allocated in Article III of the 1922 Compact).  This was a major point of 
concern, especially since the de facto delivery obligation interpretation of Article III(d) 
dominated most of the negotiations, the text of the enacted Upper Basin Compact, and many 
subsequent meetings.
33
  The 1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact served two main 
purposes: (1) apportioning the Upper Basin’s allocation among the states (Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah and Wyoming)
34
; and (2) dividing the responsibility of each state for the delivery 
of water to the Lower Basin.
35
  While the language of Article IV in the Upper Basin Compact 
uses the word “deplete” and not “deliver,”
36
 the majority of the provisions use delivery in 
reference to the Upper Basin’s obligation.
37 
During the negotiations of the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the overwhelming 
majority of the Upper Colorado River Commissioners acknowledged that the Upper Basin had a 
delivery obligation.  As an illustration, Colorado’s Commissioner Judge Clifford Stone provided 
the following metaphor for the other commissioners:  
These states in signing the Colorado River Compact have already pledged 
themselves – and it is the purpose of these states I know to observe the Colorado 
River Compact – to deliver 75,000,00 acre feet of water over continuing ten-year 
periods at Lee Ferry. . . figuratively we are given a pail of water. . . we have got to 
                                                 
33
 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact negotiations, Meeting No. 3, Public Hearing in Grand Junction, Volume I, 
51 (Oct. 30, 1946) (statement by Judge White: “[Delph Carpenter] assured me at the time [of the Colorado 
River Compact], and he meant it, that we were certainly protected in the Upper Basin States by agreeing to 
furnish only 7,500,000 acre feet at Lee Ferry. With the figures today, I think the engineers will find that maybe 
Delph Carpenter was mistaken at that time and it is going to be a job to furnish that amount of water or ten 
times that amount of water averaged in the ten year period”). 
34
 A small quantity (50,000 acre-feet) was also allocated to Arizona in recognition of northeastern Arizona’s location 
in the Upper Basin. Upper Colorado River Compact, C.R.S.A. §37-62-101, art. III(a)(1). 
35
 Upper Colorado River Compact, C.R.S.A. §37-62-101, art. I(a). 
36
 “[I]n the event curtailment of use of water by the States of the Upper Division at any time shall become necessary 
in order that the flow at Lee Ferry shall not be depleted below that required by Article III of the Colorado River 
Compact.” Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, C.R.S.A. §37-62-101, art. IV. 
37
 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, C.R.S.A. §37-62-101: 
art. I(a): “The major purposes of this Compact are...to establish the obligations of each State of Upper 
Division with respect to the deliveries of water required to be made at Lee Ferry by the Colorado River 
Compact...” 
art. III(c): “delivery at Lee Ferry” 
art. V(b)(1) and (c): “obligations to deliver water at Lee Ferry,” “assure deliveries at Lee Ferry” 
art. IX(a): “the obligation of the States of the Upper Division to make deliveries of water at Lee Ferry” 
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empty out half of that pail of water for the Lower Basin, and then we allocate 
among ourselves, among five states, what is left.
38
   
The permanence of the 7.5 million acre-feet that must be delivered to the Lower Basin 
was echoed in both the studies of the Engineering Advisory Committee and the interpretations of 
the legal staff.  One Colorado Engineer reminded the Commission that the obligation was a 
“fixed, static quantity of water” and  an amount “upon which the Lower Basin [were] basing 
their plans for the future.”
39
  The legal counsel for Wyoming, W.J. Wehrli, claimed that if the 
Colorado River Compact Commission had really intended to create an obligation “not to 
deplete,” that they would have worded Article III(a) in the following way:  
‘There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River system in perpetuity to the 
Upper Basin an amount of water which will deplete the flow at Lee Ferry not to 
exceed 7,500,000 acre feet and an amount of water to the Lower Basin which will 
deplete the flow at the International boundary not to exceed 7,500,000 acre 
feet.’
40
   
Throughout the committee hearings on the ratification of the Upper Colorado River Basin 
Compact and the early years of the Upper Colorado River Commission’s meetings, the sentiment 
supporting a delivery obligation continued.  In one congressional hearing, Royce Tipton, a 
Reclamation Engineer, described the seniority of the Lower Basin water rights in commenting 
that while the Upper Basin had the right to withdraw from the river 7.5 million acre-feet, this 
amount was first subject to the delivery at Lee Ferry and any other treaty obligations.
41
  During 
that same session, this question was posed to him: “Are you convinced that by proper 
engineering the Upper Basin will ultimately be able to use its apportionment of 7,500,000 acre 
feet of water annually, and, at the same time, be able to deliver according to their contract an 
average of 7,500,000 acre feet for the Lower Basin?”  Tipton coyly responded: “the Upper Basin 
can utilize the 7 ½ million acre-feet if it in turn also can make its required delivery at Lee 
                                                 
38
 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact negotiations, Meeting No. 3, Public Hearing in Farmington, Volume I, 163 
(Nov 2, 1946) (statement by Colorado Commissioner Judge Clifford Stone).  
39
 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact negotiations, Meeting No. 5 in Denver, Volume I, 80 (Dec. 1-4, 1946) 
(statement by Mr. Patterson, Colorado Engineer).  
40
 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact negotiations Meeting No. 7 in Vernal, Volume I, 57-8 (July 7-21, 1948) 
(statement by W.J. Wehrli, Special Counsel for Wyoming). He went on to say that he did not believe one could 
interpret Article III(d) of the Colorado River Compact as the Upper Basin’s obligation not to deplete without 
also construing it as meaning depletion at the International Boundary for the Lower Basin and that this question 
of interpretation would ultimately reach the Supreme Court. 
41
 Bills to Grant the Consent of the United States to the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, H.R. 2325-2334: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation, 81
st
 Cong. 38-9 (1949), available at 
http://wwa.colorado.edu/colorado_river/docs/ucrbc_1949.pdf (accessed July 1, 2011) 
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Ferry...it will always make its required delivery at Lee Ferry,”
42
  and therefore stated that the 
Lower Basin rights to 7.5 million acre-feet are senior to the Upper Basin’s 7.5 million acre-feet 
allocation. Similarly, in remarks to the newly established Upper Colorado River Commission in 
1953, Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM) discussed the potential consequences of Article III(d) 
for the Upper Basin:  
I think it is too bad that the Upper Basin states always get the residue...they have 
their obligations to fulfill and they can have what is left under the Compact, and I 
think it is going to pose a very serious problem...when you are in a position of 
taking what is left and the other people are guaranteed full amounts, and the river 
doesn’t have the full amount in it you are counting on, somebody gets short 
changed. I would give a lot if it could be switched so the Lower basin could 
guarantee us our part and they could have all that is left over, so far as I am 
concerned.43 
Only a small minority of Upper Basin interests appeared to grasp the significance of 
conceding to the delivery obligation interpretation.   One of the strongest voices came from 
Judge Jean S. Breitenstein, a legal advisor for Colorado throughout the Compact negotiations, 
during a 1951 Upper Colorado River Commission meeting:  
The obligation by III(d) in the Compact is not to deliver 75,000,000 acre feet of 
water in any ten-year period. . . I think it would be well to read that: ‘The states of 
the upper division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted 
below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of 10 consecutive 
years. . .’ it is that we will not cause the flow to be depleted; not that we will 
deliver.
44 
Perhaps even more telling than the statements of the commissioners and other 
representatives is the fact that the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact used percentages 
instead of fixed quantities to allocate water among the Upper Basin states because of uncertainty 
over the total amount of water that would be available to the Upper Basin after satisfying the 
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  Colorado was allocated 51.75 percent, New Mexico 11.25 
percent, Utah 23 percent, and Wyoming 14 percent.
46
   
 
The Colorado River Storage Project Act (1956) 
The Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 (CRSP) authorized a number of storage 
projects throughout the Upper Colorado River Basin, including, most notably, the Glen Canyon 
Dam, which is located only 16 miles upstream from Lee Ferry, the division point between the 
Upper and Lower Basins.  The operation of Glen Canyon Dam has since become the Upper 
Basin’s most direct method of regulating the flow of water through Lee Ferry and to the Lower 
Basin. 
The relevant text from the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 addresses Article 
III(d) of the Colorado River Compact only in generalities, likely due to the heated debates during 
committee meetings over the interpretation of the article.  The existence of a delivery obligation 
is perhaps alluded to in the introduction of the Colorado River Storage Project Act itself, 
explaining that the project is necessary for the purposes, among others, of “making it possible for 
the states of the Upper Basin to utilize, consistently with the provisions of the Colorado River 
Compact, the apportionments made to and among them in the Colorado River Compact and the 
Upper Basin Compact, respectively.”
47
  If the Upper Basin were subject only to the Article III(a) 
apportionment of 7.5 million acre-feet per year, the language “consistently with the provisions of 
the Colorado River Compact” would seem unnecessary, as the apportionment itself is referred to 
in the following phrase.   
The acceptance of the delivery obligation interpretation of Article III(d) is expressed 
much more directly in the testimony associated with the CRSP legislation.  Generally, the 
consensus among both the Upper and Lower Basins during the negotiations seemed to be that the 
Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 was necessary in order to combat the enormous 
fluctuations in annual flow on the Colorado River, and to provide the physical mechanism 
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needed for the Upper Basin to satisfy its downstream delivery obligation.  Senator Frank Barrett 
for Wyoming went so far as to condition delivery of the 75 million acre-feet per decade upon the 
completion of the storage projects in the Upper Basin, stating:  
I read into [the Colorado River Compact] this language, that the Upper Basin 
states are entitled to an equitable share of the water of the Colorado River and it 
was intended at that time that both the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin intended 
that we get storage projects in the Upper Basin so that we would not interfere with 
your 75 million acre-feet at Lee Ferry over a 10-year period.  If you will let us get 
those projects constructed up there so that we can store the water, you will have 
your 75 million acre-feet.
48
 
Many other statements, while not explicitly trading a delivery obligation for 
CRSP authorization like Barrett, acknowledged the central role of Upper Basin storage in 
fulfilling the de facto delivery obligation.  For example, F.C. Merreill, Chief Engineer for 
the Colorado River Water Conservation District, explained the history of Article III(d)’s 
obligation on the Upper Basin in his statement: 
During the negotiations which preceded the drafting of the 1922 compact by the 
Colorado River Commission, one member of that commission had a fixed 
determination to secure for the people of the Lower Basin a firm guaranty of 
Colorado River flow to the Lower Basin.  Mr. Norviel of Arizona, did not at any 
time desist from his determination to secure such a guaranty and he was, in the 
end, successful.  The primary reason the upper-basin people feel they must have 
the storage project is to counteract the deleterious effect of that guaranty in the 
1922 compact upon the Upper Basin.
49 
The role of new storage in meeting the delivery obligation was also articulated by 
Wyoming Governor Milward L. Simpson, who argued: 
The proposed storage units are essential elements of the overall Upper Colorado 
River Basin development project.  They are part and parcel of a program to permit 
the use by the Upper Basin states of the water allocated to them under the 1922 
Colorado River compact.  They are necessary to the Upper Basin states in 
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connection with meeting the water-delivery obligation at Lee Ferry imposed by 
the 1922 Colorado River compact.
50 
The Governor of Colorado at the time, Edwin Johnson, a former Senator for Colorado, 
expressed one of the most definitive pro-delivery obligation interpretations of the Colorado River 
Compact: 
My belief is, and I get that belief from reading the compact very carefully, that the 
first priority is the existing water rights at the time when the compact was signed.  
That is the first priority.  The second priority in the 10-year cycle is that the lower 
states are entitled to have delivered at Lee Ferry 75 million acre-feet of water.  
The third priority is that the upper states then get 75 million acre-feet of water.  I 
should have been talking about years because I am running into difficulty now.  
Then the fourth priority is the million acre-feet of water that has been given to the 
lower states per annum.
51 
A similar sentiment can be found in a Senate Joint Memorial (No. 8) stressing the 
necessity of the storage projects in meeting the required delivery to the Lower Basin, explaining, 
“the states of the Upper Colorado River Basin under the Colorado River Compact of 1922 are 




Although the delivery obligation interpretation offered by Governor Johnson and others 
was roundly endorsed by several Lower Basin interests,
53
 not all Upper Basin interests were 
willing to fully concede to the delivery obligation interpretation.  For example, Senator Clinton 
Anderson from New Mexico argued that the Article III(a) apportionment to the Upper Basin 
would be a nullity if the Article III(d) obligation took priority.  In describing the compact, he 
explains: 
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It starts off by trying to say that it is to divide the waters.  If you take the position 
that certain peoples’ rights are firm and all other rights are subject to that, that we 
are only the residuary legatees, we get whatever might be left, then they should 
never have started off by saying in Article III: There is hereby apportioned from 
the Colorado River Basin in perpetuity to the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, 
respectively, the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of 
water per annum.  If they were not going to do that they should have started off by 
saying the Lower Basin should be given 7.5 million acre-feet; the Upper Basin 
has everything that is left and everything above that.
54 
In addition to the above arguments from Senator Anderson, some Upper Basin state 
senators asserted that their representatives to the Colorado River Compact in 1922 were skilled 
negotiators who would not have settled with secondary water rights, or those already assured 
under their present perfected rights.  Senator Barrett from Wyoming summarized: 
In this respect I cannot understand how you could conclude that the fine people 
from the Upper Basin states who negotiated this compact at Santa Fe attempted to 
get a fair and equitable share of the waters of the Colorado River, yet the only 
guaranty they came out with was the vested water rights which they didn’t need 
anybody at the Santa Fe compact to guarantee.  They had them.
55 
Nonetheless, while not all parties were willing to concede to the delivery obligation 
interpretation of Article III(d), the prevailing reasoning across the basin for the necessity of the 
Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 seems to rest on the “delivery obligation” argument. 
The delivery obligation interpretation seemed to be the prevailing one among Department of the 
Interior officials as well.  The sentiment expressed by Elmer Bennett, Legislative Counsel for the 
Department of the Interior, was typical: 
There is some difference of opinion on that, but I believe it is conceded by us - I 
would not want to say that flatly - but it is my understanding that the Department 
takes the view that the 75 million is a guaranty which probably assumes priority 
over and above Upper Basin uses of water. 
56 
                                                 
54
 An Act to Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Colorado River Storage 
Project and Participating Projects, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 84th Cong. 240 (February 28, 1955) (statement of Clinton Anderson, Senator for New Mexico). 
55
 An Act to Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Colorado River Storage 
Project and Participating Projects, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 84th Cong. 247 (February 28, 1955) (statement of Frank Barrett, Senator for Wyoming). 
56
 An Act to Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Colorado River Storage 
Project and Participating Projects, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 84th Cong. 267 (March 9, 1955) (statement of Elmer Bennett, Legislative Counsel for the 
Department of the Interior). 
 
16 
Arizona v. California (1963) 
The Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California finalized the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act’s distribution of Colorado River water among the Lower Basin states, and as such, 
did not directly affect or discuss the Upper Basin’s obligation at Lee Ferry.  However, in light of 
the Upper Basin’s previous decision (in the Upper Basin Compact) to divide their apportionment 
according to percentages due to the varying flow of the river, the Court’s decision to allocate the 
Lower Basin apportionment between the states in concrete numbers, measured in million acre-
feet, could be indicative of the Court’s interpretation of Article III(d) of the Colorado River 
Compact.   
In outlining the plan for allocating the Lower Basin waters, Justice Hugo Black was 
careful to note that the supply in question was based solely upon the waters flowing through Lee 
Ferry.  Referring to the water provided by the Upper Basin, Justice Black explained,  “these 
allocations were to come only out of the mainstream, that is, as stated by the Governors, out of 
'the average annual delivery of water to be provided by the states of the upper division at Lee 
Ferry, under the terms of the Colorado River Compact.”
57 
In addition to using concrete numbers, 
58
 the Court included in its division of the lower 
Colorado River waters a plan for splitting up any surplus flows from the Upper Basin, but no 
method for the Lower Basin’s dealing with shortages, indicating an assumption that the Upper 
Basin would always deliver the obligatory 7.5 million acre-feet, regardless of the total flow of 
the river.  The Supreme Court decree, published almost one year after the decision in Arizona v. 
California, does include a plan for dealing with shortages, but does not indicate whether the 
shortage is due to naturally occurring low flows or to the Upper Basin’s withdraws.
59
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Additionally, the plan for dealing with Lower Basin shortages is for those situations when 
insufficient water is released to support 7.5 million acre-feet of consumptive use downstream, 
which due to evaporation and system losses, requires annual releases from the Upper Basin of 
approximately 1 million acre-feet higher than the average 7.5 million acre-feet described in 
Article III(d).  Thus, even though a plan for managing Lower Basin shortages was devised, the 
assumption still may have been that Upper Basin releases of 7.5 million acre-feet would be 
maintained. 
 
The Colorado River Basin Project Act (1968) 
In response to Arizona v. California and several proposed projects in the Lower Basin, in 
1965 the Upper Basin states commissioned a report on the water supplies of the Colorado 
River.
60
  In analyzing the water supply on both the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado 
River, Royce Tipton, then President of the Upper Colorado River Commission, utilized a 
delivery obligation interpretation of Article III(d) of the Colorado River Compact in making his 
analysis, requiring a minimum delivery obligation of 7.5 million acre-feet per year in his 
scenarios.
61
  In fact, Tipton (and co-author Kalmbach) used the presumed delivery obligation 
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(from Article III(d)) to quantify the potential practical diminishment of the Upper Basin 
apportionment (from Article III(a)):  
Without importation of water, and such modifications in the required delivery of 
water at Lee Ferry as would be necessary for the Upper Basin to benefit from the 
importation of water, it is assumed that the total net beneficial consumptive use in 
the states of the upper division cannot be more than 5.6 million acre-feet per year, 
and might not be more than 4.8 million acre-feet per year.
62
 
Tipton’s report made the Upper Basin representatives wary of the Colorado River Basin 
Project Act (CRBPA).  While authorizing several projects in both basins, the CRBPA is most 
notable for approving the Central Arizona Project (CAP) (but making CAP’s priority junior to 
California’s water allocations) and instructing the Secretary of the Interior to develop long-term 
operating criteria for the Colorado River system.
63
  Section 602(a) of CRBPA listed the priority 
for releases from Lake Powell in the following order: 1) to supply one-half the deficiency of the 
Mexican Treaty obligation; and 2) to comply with Article III(d) of the Colorado River 
Compact.
64
  While this language appears to suggest a delivery obligation perspective, section 
602(a)(3) also directs the Secretary to take into account “all relevant factors” (such as historic 
stream-flows, the most critical period of record, and probabilities of water supply) to determine 
what is “reasonably necessary to assure deliveries under clauses (1) and (2) without impairment 
of annual consumptive uses in the Upper Basin pursuant to the Colorado River Compact.”
65
  This 
provision can be interpreted to mean that the Upper Basin would not be subject to a compact call 
during a shortage.
66
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In the committee hearings regarding this Act, it was routinely presented that the Upper 
Basin could not use its full allocation while releasing 7.5 million acre-feet/year to the Lower 
Basin, resulting in practicably available supplies for the Upper Basin between 5.56 and 6.2 
million acre-feet.
67
  Not surprisingly, much of the opposition to the legislation came from the 
Upper Basin, who advocated a more basin-wide approach to shortages and worried that Arizona 
would be permanently taking a portion of their allocation.
68
  As an illustration, Utah Senator 
Frank Moss cautioned: “that much water simply is not there. . . What the administration’s central 
Arizona project will do is borrow water from the Upper Basin states.”
69
  At the same time, Upper 
Basin representatives also tried to emphasize that any legislation should permit states in the 
Upper Basin to deliver water at Lee Ferry without impairment of their own uses and refused to 
concede that “the first 7.5 million acre-feet available necessarily must go to the Lower Basin.”
 70 
 
This viewpoint was reinforced by comments from Edward Weinberg, the Deputy Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior, who emphasized that “the Upper Basin has no hard-and-fast 
obligation to make a delivery of water that Nature does not put in the river.”
71
  The following 
interaction between Colorado’s Senator Gordon Allot and Wyoming’s State Engineer, L.C. 
Bishop, illustrates the confusion between the intent of the negotiators and the way that Article 
III(d) is presumed to function: 
Senator Allott:  [A]s far as the Upper Basin states, the error if it as made, was not 
in the attempt to ascertain the amount of waters then available in the Colorado 
River, but rather while the broad implication was that they were dividing the 
waters of the river equally, with the diminishing water supply we have been 
caught on the horns of the absolute flat guarantee of delivery at Lee Ferry. . .  I 
think [the mistake] was made in this respect of not dividing the waters equally, 
rather than putting us, the upper states, in the position of delivering a specified flat 
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amount which was based upon an assumption of water available which has not 
proven out in subsequent years. 
Bishop:  Yes, sir.  I would only add to that that I really think it was their intent to 
divide the water equally at that time.  Their assumption that there was more water 
in the river than has proven to be the actual case led them to include this provision 
whereby we are required to deliver a certain minimum amount to the Lower 
Basin. 
Senator Allott:  They might have been thinking in those terms, but unfortunately 
you know as well as anyone that isn’t what the compact said. 
Bishop:  Only in this way can there be a meaningful assurance that the slower 
developing areas will be able in future years to utilize the water which is granted 
to them by the compacts.  Such assurance was the original intent of these 
documents and it is unthinkable that the Congress would now consider taking any 
action which might nullify or circumvent the protection granted the individual 
states through these agreements.
72
  
The CRBPA also required the Secretary of the Interior to develop operating guidelines 
for the Colorado River reservoirs, establishing the Glen Canyon objective release value at 8.23 
million acre-feet—the quantity, assuming a 20,000 acre-foot contribution from the Paria River, 
presumably sufficient to satisfy the Upper Basin’s obligations to the Lower Basin (7.5 million 
acre-feet) and Mexico (0.75 million acre-feet).
73
  In this way, “a minimum release of 8.23 
million acre-feet [was] required regardless of the water conditions in the Upper Basin.”
74
  
Although the Upper Basin argued that this quantity was an “objective release” and not an 
obligation, this operation essentially created an inflexible annual delivery obligation of 8.23 
million acre-feet instead of the 75,000,000 every ten years as Article III(d) Colorado River 
Compact requires.
75
  While the Secretary of the Interior does have the authority to adjust the 
amount required for Lake Powell releases, in 2005, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton decided 
for that year, even in the face of a drought, the Upper Basin could not reduce its annual delivery 
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to the Lower Basin.
76
  Some of this flexibility was restored in 2007 in the Colorado River Interim 
Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake 
Mead (“Interim Guidelines”) which provides for releases less than 8.23 million acre-feet when 
storage in Lake Powell is unusually low.
77
   
 
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act (1974) 
During the negotiations for the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act of 1974, most 
parties seemed wary of directly discussing the water apportionments between the Upper and 
Lower Basins.  However, much of the commentary leading up to the legislation was based on the 
delivery obligation interpretation.  For example, one federal report cautioned:  
Using current estimates of long-term average flows of the Colorado River, it is 
believed that the Upper Basin is assured the use of approximately 5.8 million 
acre-feet annually of the Colorado River while still meeting its Compact 
obligation for deliveries to the Lower Basin.  The Upper Basin’s current water use 
is approximately 3.3 million acre-feet annually.
78 
In this excerpt, as in many others from previous decades, the assumption is that the Upper Basin 
is entitled to the difference between the total flow of the river and the “Compact obligation for 
deliveries to the Lower Basin,” and nothing more.  Under the parameters used in this particular 
study, that number is approximately 5.8 million acre-feet annually, significantly less than the 7.5 
million acre-feet allotted in Article III(a). 
To the extent that the conversation has changed at all, the new element was to question 
the rationality of supporting additional Upper Basin development not only due to a lack of 
available water, but due to downstream environmental impacts.  For example, Jack O. Horton, 
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Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Land and Water Resources, cautioned about the dangers of 
full Upper Basin development: 
Salinity will affect future development of Upper Basin resources.  While Lower 
Basin development is nearly completed, considerable Upper Basin development 
remains possible.  Further development may, however, lead to salinity levels 
which would do unacceptable damage, primarily in the Lower Basin.  The 
problem cannot be divorced from planned future development of the basin’s water 
resources and the resulting water demands.
79 
The Sierra Club took this caution about the effects of full development one step further, as John 
A. McComb, the Southwest Representative, stated: 
The existing compacts and other legal measures which apportion the water among 
the various states should not be regarded as a license for development at any cost.  
The alternative of limiting development has many political, economic, and 
environmental ramifications, but it should definitely not be casually dismissed. 
The only mention of the apportionment issue in the actual Act is found in Section 207, 
which states the commonly used boiler plate language from previous acts: 
Except as provided in section 205(b) and 205(d) of this title, with respect to the 
Colorado River Basin Project Act and the Colorado River Storage Project Act, 
respectively, nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, repeal, 
modify, interpret, or be in conflict with the provisions of the Colorado River 
Compact, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Water Treaty of 1944 
with the United Mexican States, the decree entered by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Arizona against California and others, the Boulder Canyon 
Project Act, Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act, section 15 of the Colorado 
River Storage Project Act, the Colorado River Basin Project Act, section 6 of the 
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project Act, section 15 of the Navajo Indian irrigation 
project and initial stage of the San Juan-Chama Project Act, the National 
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The interpretation of Article III(d) remains a contested and increasingly significant issue, 
especially with forecasts of future Colorado River flows showing insufficient water to supply 
both the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin with their full Article III(a) apportionments while 
meeting the Mexican Delivery obligation.  The Upper Basin finds itself in the difficult position 
of not wanting to concede to the prevailing delivery obligation interpretation, while also not 
wanting to provoke a fight on the issue.  As observed by Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell in 1994:  
Although the Upper Basin disagrees with this interpretation, it illustrates the fact 
that the Upper Basin may be stuck with considerably less than it bargained for in 
1922. Nevertheless, the Upper Basin does not desire to renegotiate that or any 
other compact. The Upper Basin will, however, vigorously protect its 
entitlements, and its right to develop in the future, because it does not enjoy the 
same level of certainty enjoyed by the Lower Division states...81 
It has not been the intent of this paper to handicap any potential lawsuit among the basins 
regarding this issue, but rather to map out the major arguments that would be featured.  In 
summary, those in favor of the “obligation not to deplete” interpretation of Article III(d) would 
likely rely on the actual language of the Compact, which uses the word deplete in lieu of any 
mention of a delivery.  Additionally, the “obligation not to deplete” proponents would likely rely 
on the nullity argument, that Article III(a) would have no purpose for being included in the 
Compact were Article III(d) to be interpreted as a concrete delivery obligation.  The third 
argument most likely to be made by those in favor of the “obligation not to deplete” 
interpretation would be that the Upper Basin commissioners present during the negotiation of the 
1922 Compact would not have settled with their already-protected rights, and that these skilled 
arbitrators would have fought to secure a more equitable division of the water than ceding to the 
Lower Basin the first priority on the river.   
In contrast, the arguments used by those in favor of the “delivery obligation” 
interpretation of Article III(d) would likely be based upon the understanding of legislators, 
engineers and lawyers both during and after the Compact negotiations.  First, that the Lower 
Basin’s priority was an intentional concession made by the Upper Basin in order to secure a 
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“cap” on the Lower Basin’s water use, to protect the remaining water for future Upper Basin use.  
Second, the “delivery obligation” proponents would likely argue that the Upper Basin Storage 
Project of 1956, including Glen Canyon Dam, was authorized as a way for the Upper Basin to 
meet this delivery obligation to the Lower Basin, as argued by the Upper Basin itself during the 
negotiations.  Finally, the “delivery obligation” proponents would likely use the interstate 
apportionments as further proof that the Lower Basin was to receive a fixed amount of water, as 
their interstate apportionments are concrete numbers, as compared to the Upper Basin’s 
percentage-based interstate apportionments.  
While the “obligation not to deplete” argument appears compelling when looking at only 
the text of the 1922 Compact, the “delivery obligation” interpretation is consistently articulated 
in the statements of decision-makers responsible for building the Law of the River, and in the 
writings of academics that have carefully tracked this evolution.  Depending on how the conflict 
is settled, either by negotiation or in court, either interpretation—or some compromise position—
could conceivably prevail, casting tremendous uncertainty over a basin already burdened with 
climbing demands, persistent drought, and the specter of climate change.   
 
